

## **Testimony**

### **I. Introduction:**

Honorable members of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, fellow members of the law enforcement community, distinguished guests...good afternoon. I come before you today not only as Chief of Police of a major metropolitan city in the South East, but as a representative of police professionals across this nation who have been faced with one of the most significant challenges in the history of American law enforcement.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took an enormous personal toll on the policing profession. At the time, I was Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department. Prior to that, I spent twenty-nine years with the New York City Police Department, where I retired as First Deputy Police Commissioner, the number two person in that organization. I knew many of those who died on that day. Some were former colleagues; others were just ordinary citizens.

The City of Miami is South Florida's largest city. It is known as the "Gateway to the Americas" and serves as an international hub due to its international airport (*third highest international passenger traffic in the U.S.*) and busy seaport (*approximately 8 million tons of cargo pass through the port yearly/it is also the busiest cruise ship port in world*). Additionally, the Miami River is Florida's fifth busiest cargo port. The River terminates near the airport, thereby presenting vulnerability to Miami International Airport and its surrounding infrastructure. The Metromover and the Metrorail are two components of the county's mass transportation systems that cut through the heart of Miami, where thousands commute on a daily basis. Miami is also home to the second largest concentration of international banks in the country, 64 consulates, several bi-national chambers of commerce, and foreign trade offices. These factors make Miami a unique city that presents special challenges for counterterrorism officials and an attractive target for terrorists looking to strike at the region's economy. Additionally, it is important to note that 14 of the 9/11 hijackers resided in South Florida prior to the attacks.

When I became Chief of Police of the Miami Police Department in January of 2003, one of Mayor Manny Diaz's priorities was to develop a comprehensive antiterrorism initiative, including intelligence gathering, community involvement, rapid response and mitigation. Toward that end, I am pleased to report that my agency has established the Miami Police Department's Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security

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(OEM), responsible for overseeing training, policy, resource deployment, and the development of situational/operational plans. This Unit is charged with the production of the Department's local terrorism preparedness/response plan. Four critical areas: Intelligence, Prevention/Education, Response/Mitigation, and Training are key components of this plan and are detailed further in this testimony. The Miami Police Department's terrorism response plan is quite comprehensive. It is meant to identify and deal with any eventuality involving acts of terrorism, whether it is the delivery of a suspicious package or a weapon of mass destruction attack in heavily-populated Downtown Miami.

Further, the Miami Police Department has taken substantial steps to train its personnel in counterterrorism. Today, all MPD officers are trained and equipped with the latest in Personal Protection Equipment (PPE). They are able to utilize their gear immediately upon being mobilized for an all-hazardous incident. Recently, a state-of-the-art Mobile Command Center vehicle was added to our emergency response fleet. This vehicle gives our first responders the ability to have a mobile command center on the scene of an incident within minutes of an emergency. Of equal importance is the development of Operation Miami Shield, a counterterrorism awareness program explained further in this document (*Operation Miami Shield manuals enclosed*).

As Co-Chairman of the FBI's South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force, I am fully aware of the enormous challenges the South Florida law enforcement community has faced and overcome. I have also witnessed a dramatic change in the posture of federal authorities in dealing with local law enforcement. I can't stress enough the importance of multi-agency cooperation, communication and organized coordination among agencies in the event we are called to take action.

Highlighted below is a breakdown of a few of the Miami Police Department's strategies against terrorism.

## **II. Intelligence:**

Without question, the number one weapon in our fight against terrorism is good, actionable intelligence that informs law enforcement of what may happen so authorities can take affirmative steps to prevent or interrupt a possible terrorist plot. The emergence of homegrown terror cells in the U.S. and other countries, such as Britain and Spain, highlights the importance of intelligence and the significant role of local law enforcement.

Since the events of September 11, the relationship between federal and local law enforcement agencies has improved tremendously and has proven to be vital in achieving greater levels of cooperation, coordination, and exchange of information.

The following entities have the ability to gather intelligence/information and disseminate it effectively, and in a timely manner, to the appropriate law enforcement agencies. Our

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overall effectiveness in the arena of homeland security is enhanced by our ability to tap into the following.

The City of Miami Police Department has joined forces with the **FBI** as a member of the **Miami FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force**. The Task Force has been very aggressive in intelligence gathering and investigation of terrorist activity in this region. Most recently, it successfully concluded a significant investigation into a homegrown terror cell bent on destroying government and law enforcement buildings in Miami. The plot was disrupted with the arrest of seven individuals who now await trial in Miami Federal Court.

**The Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSTF)** consists of all-state and local law enforcement agencies that communicate in the region and share information with the common goal of combating terrorism.

**Terrorism Alert Guide** is used as a tool by the Miami Police Department. The guide utilizes existing public/police partnerships to deter, dissuade, and discourage terrorism. The terrorism guide provides several avenues for the gathering of intelligence.

**ThreatCom** is a state program run by the **Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)** designed to strengthen domestic security prevention, preparedness, protection, response, and recovery through interdisciplinary interagency consensus and commitment. This is achieved by building and relying on regional mutual aid response capabilities. ThreatCom has also developed a paging system that allows the forwarding of information and intelligence to state and local law enforcement agencies.

### **III. Prevention/Education:**

Terrorists choose their targets based on weaknesses and vulnerabilities they observe in high rise buildings, critical infrastructure, facilities, and transportation sites. They are known to study routines, customs, habits and schedules of those associated with their intended targets. Terrorists, just like the common criminal, seek to avoid detection and blend in with the crowd. To deal with this threat, the Miami Police Department created **Operation Miami Shield**.

**Operation Miami Shield** is the flagship antiterrorism program of the Miami Police Department aimed to engage and educate the general public on the subject. It operates in this manner: Twice a month, on different days and times, locations are chosen within the city to which police personnel and resources are deployed. The selection of the location is based on its potential for a terrorist attack. This is called a soft target. Officers are assigned a strategic post that makes them highly visible. In addition, terrorism awareness pamphlets are distributed to the general public in three languages, English, Spanish and Creole, and an audiovisual public service announcement, also in the three languages, runs continuously at the command post for pedestrians to view. Supervisors, in turn, make contact with building managers and local merchants to provide them with information,

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literature and training designed to enhance their awareness and educate them on the actions they should take in the event they become a target.

While at the scene, the Miami Police Department uses a valuable tool designed to gather and document specific information about a potential target. It is a way to catalog critical infrastructure within the city. The tool is the **Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS CAM)**. HLS CAM also assists building security, administrative personnel and merchants in identifying and addressing potential weaknesses in their structures or in their daily practice.

### **Terrorism Alert Guide:**

The **Miami Shield Terrorism Alert Guide**, distributed to citizens and merchants during the operation, contains the following:

What does **Operation Miami Shield** stand for?

Serve as the eyes and ears for your community

Have a plan in place at home and work

Identify potential problems and notify police

Evaluate your surroundings and stay alert

Learn evacuation and emergency contingency plans

Do not aggravate the incident; simply watch and call police

The guide tells citizens to “**See Something Say Something**”, which explains to the public that they are the eyes and ears of the region by working together with police and fire rescue/emergency first responders. The guide urges the public to pay attention to their surroundings, notice anything that is unusual and report it to the police. It also lists the **Seven (7) Signs of Terrorism**:

1. Surveillance
2. Elicitation
3. Test of security
4. Acquiring supplies
5. Suspicious person out of place
6. Dry Run/Trial Run
7. Deploying assets

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Business-card style **Miami Shield Information Cards** are also distributed throughout the city and are available at the Miami Police Department's three district police stations as well as at satellite locations at the neighborhood level.

#### **IV. Response/Mitigation:**

The Miami Police Department has developed comprehensive plans for response, mitigation, and recovery for any natural or man-made disaster which may threaten the lives, safety or property of the citizens of Miami.

The following are examples of operations conducted by the Miami Police Department in an attempt to assess its response capabilities and address training needs.

##### **Operation Eagle Eye:**

On March 4, 2005 the Miami Police Department conducted a large-scale functional Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise called **Operation Eagle Eye**. The operation involved more than 600 Miami Police officers, sworn personnel from neighboring jurisdictions, Miami firefighters, and over 1,000 volunteers.

Operation Eagle Eye, conducted at four venues, was designed to challenge the responders to accomplish several objectives as well as determine the Department's level of preparedness in response to a terrorist attack. This successful operation revealed the Department's current capabilities in the area of WMD response and recovery and gave command staff an idea of the areas that needed improvement. This operation was witnessed and evaluated by outside observers, including staff from the **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**.

##### **Operation Pigeon Drop:**

On January 31, 2006 **Operation Pigeon Drop** was designed to test Miami Police Headquarters' mail room policies and procedures. The exercise featured the evacuation of ninety percent of the building in response to a simulated anthrax delivery. It also tested the agency's Incident Command System's ability to coordinate with the Miami Fire Rescue's Hazmat Team and first responders.

##### **Operation White Powder:**

On Thursday April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006, the City of Miami Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security assisted the Crescent Corporation in **Operation White Powder**, a test of security measures at 201 Biscayne Tower (a critical infrastructure in the City of Miami). The successful operation revealed that they were on track with their policies and procedures on evacuations and the handling of a powder incident.

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### **Operation Cassandra:**

On July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006, Miami Police participated in **Operation Cassandra** in cooperation with the **Urban Area Security Initiative-Miami Project (UASI)**. This tactical interoperability communications exercise focused primarily on communication between participating regional agencies. Members of the **U.S. Department of Homeland Security -Office of Grants and Training** evaluated the exercise.

Personnel assigned to a command post at the Orange Bowl Stadium handled a simulated explosion in Miami-Dade County's Administration Building. Over 4,000 employees work and visit this building on a daily basis. It is also a crucial mass transit hub. The after action report revealed that Region VII (Miami and participating agencies) ranked among the best in the country.

### **Resources:**

The following are examples of resources available to assist the Miami Police Department in recovery efforts.

**Southeast Region Domestic Security Task Force (SERDSRF):** These regional teams provide ample response capabilities throughout the region in response to a WMD event. They are equipped with compatible and standardized equipment and training and they adhere and comply with relevant sections of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the State of Florida Incident Field Operations Guide (FOG).

Additionally, the Miami Police Department utilizes the federal government's **Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)** in order to ensure the continued performance of minimum essential functions during a wide range of potential emergencies. This is accomplished through the development of plans, procedures, and provisions for alternate facilities, personnel, resources, interoperable communications, and vital records/ databases.

A **Mobile Emergency Command Center Vehicle** is now a component of Miami PD's fleet that allows for interoperable communication with regional assets. The command center is also equipped with a satellite system and a mobile weather station.

### **V: Training:**

The key to a successful terrorism response plan is in the development of standardized training programs such as the **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** and the **Incident Command System (ICS)**. The federal government should be commended for setting national standards for incident command. For example, standardized training programs allow police personnel from any given location to respond to an incident by using the same management tools and practices as outlined by the federal government.

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The following are examples of terrorism response training programs that have been conducted by the Miami Police Department:

**Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)**  
**Response Platoon Training**  
**Simulated Disaster Training**  
**Preparation for Mobilization Training**  
**Emergency Operations Center**  
**Interoperable Communications**  
**Field Force Training**  
**Vehicle Rescue Training**  
**Weapons of Mass Destruction**

## **VI. Conclusion:**

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, local police have come a long way. Police departments are better trained, better equipped, and certainly better informed than they have ever been regarding terrorism.

This progress could not have been achieved without the support of and partnership with the federal government. Quite simply, local police do not have the resources or funding, and in some cases, the sophistication to deal with a major terrorist incident. The locals often viewed terrorism as a national responsibility to be dealt with exclusively by the feds. The events of September 11 and subsequent events, here and abroad, have made it clear that terrorism is everybody's responsibility. Local law enforcement has a very important role in intelligence gathering, investigation, response and mitigation in the event of a terrorist attack. I think we have made great progress over the past five years. While some people complain that not enough has been done, I think it's more important to emphasize what, in fact, *has* been done. By any objective analysis, one can only conclude that an awful lot has been done.

There are still, however, two problem areas that I believe need to be addressed. First, federal allocation of funds must be based on risk target richness and vulnerability. Clearly, a major city is more likely to be a target of a terrorist attack rather than a rural area. The notion of reducing New York City's funding last year, in favor of less populated areas, is just outrageous. Major cities need fair and appropriate funding that goes directly to the cities in a timely manner, without stop-offs at state and county governments.

Second, we are now five years out from September 11 and it is still not clear to me who has the ultimate responsibility for intelligence gathering and dissemination.

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Is it the FBI? Is it Homeland Security? Is it Mr. Negroponte's office? My preference would be that this task be vested with the FBI. The FBI has made significant improvements to the gathering and timely dissemination of intelligence information under Director Robert Mueller and it already has the appropriate structure in place, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, to carry out this responsibility. Do we really want to spend the next three to five years standing up a new intelligence agency that offers no guarantee of success and which may, in fact, make us vulnerable over the coming years?

Thank you for giving me the honor to speak before this committee.

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